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COMMENTS
The Third Circuit Trilogy: "Is the Collateral Mortgagor
Personally Liable?"
I. INTRODUCTION
Is the maker of a collateral mortgage note personally liable for the face value
of the note when such amount is greater than the value of the property which
securesthe note via a collateralmortgage? If the maker of the collateral mortgage
note is also the principal obligor of the debt which the collateral mortgage note
secures, the question is superfluous since the maker of the collateralmortgage note
is already personally liable for the principal debt secured. However, the question
takes on added importance when the collateral mortgagor secures the debt of a
third person. Does the collateralmortgagor take on personal liability by securing
the debt of a third party? From the viewpoint of the collateral mortgagor, the
answer to this question can mean the difference between relinquishing only a
certain portion of his patrimony to the holder of the collateral mortgage note and
subjecting the entirety of his patrimony to the claim of such holder. The
difference in the two results is significant and hinges on whether the liability
createdby a collateral mortgage package is in rem or in personam.
Louisiana courts have taken divergent positions, commentators have
authoritatively proclaimed the collateral mortgagor is personally bound, and the
Louisiana Supreme Court has declined to offer a final and definitive answer.
The purpose of this article is to analyze these differing opinions, or lack of
opinion, and possibly offer a view that has not been completely articulated in the
jurisprudence or commentary. This article will begin with an analysis of the
"Third Circuit Trilogy." The "Trilogy" encompasses three Louisiana Third
Circuit Court of Appeal decisions in which the court has adopted the position
that the maker of the collateral mortgage note does incur personal liability when
securing the debt of a third person. An analysis of a contrary position will
follow with decisions from two Louisiana Courts of Appeal and a United States
District Court. Finally, this article will conclude with a critique of the Louisiana
Law Review article which sparked the current split in authority.
H. THE THiRD CIRCUIT TRILOGY
A. Bank of Lafayette v. Bailey
The notion that a collateral mortgagor is personally liable for the debt
evidenced by a collateral mortgage note was first recognizedby the third circuit
in the case of Bank of Lafayette v. Bailey. In Bailey, a husband and wife
Copyright 1999, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 531 So. 2d 294 (La. App. 3d Cir.), rev'd in part, 533 So. 2d 5 (1988).
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executed a collateral mortgage of immovable community property and executed
a collateral mortgage note for $250,000.2 The collateral mortgage note
was secured by the mortgage, payable on demand, and signed by both
parties. Two days later, both parties executed a pledge of the collateral
mortgage and collateral mortgage note to secure any indebtedness of the
husband up to $250,000. The husband subsequently executed a hand note
which he defaulted on, resulting in a seizure and sale of the mortgaged
property and a deficiency judgment against 'the wife for the unsatisfied
portion of the hand note.
Finding the wife personally liable for such deficiency, the court held that
"the collateral mortgage note being pledged for [the hand note].., bound both
Mr. and Mrs. Bailey, in solido, for payment of the... [hand note] up to the full
amount of the collateral mortgage note."3 Although the court did not expressly
state that the maker of a collateral mortgage note is subject to personal liability
for such note, such a conclusion is inevitable because the wife did not co-sign
the hand note. Had the wife co-signed the hand note, a finding of personal
liability would not have been problematic.4
Furthermore, the court's recognition that the husband and wife were
solidarily liable lends support to the view that the maker of a collateral mortgage
note is personally liable on the note. Had the court held that the maker of a
collateral mortgage note is not bound in personam but only in ren, the
court arguably would have been unable to find solidary liability between
the parties. This results because "[a]n obligation is solidary for the
obligors when each obligor is liable for the whole performance."' If the
maker of the collateral mortgage note is bound only up to the value of
the property which secures the note, she would not be liable for the
whole performance of the hand note. In contrast, the maker of the hand
note would be liable for the whole performance of his obligation.
Likewise, it has been held that where one obligor is bound in rem and
the other is personally bound for the same obligation, there can be no
solidary relationship between the obligors. "  Thus, the Bailey court's
finding of solidary liability between the husband and wife was obviously
dependent on its view that the maker of a collateral mortgage note is
personally bound to the holder of such note.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 298.
4. See La. R.S. 10:3-401 which provides in part: "(a) A person is not liable on an instrument
unless (i) the person signed the instrument...."
5. La. Civ. Code art 1794; but see Hoefly v. GEICO, 418 So. 2d 575 (La. 1982) (uninsured
motorist insurer solidarily liable with tortfeasor up to amount of policy limits but not solidarily liable
for damages that exceed policy limits).
6. Genina Marine Servs., Inc. v. Arco Oil & Gas Co., 552 So. 2d 1005 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1990)
(statutory lien created only in rem liability so that no solidary relationship existed with obligor who
was bound personally).
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B. Concordia Bank v. Lowry
With the Bailey decision as a backdrop, the third circuit again addressed the
personal liability of the maker of a collateral mortgage note in Concordia Bank
v. Lowry.7 Six members of the Lowry family executed a collateral mortgage
and $100,000 collateral mortgage note in favor of the lender.' The note was
pledged pursuant to a pledge agreement in which all six family members agreed
that the collateral mortgage would secure the indebtedness of any of the
mortgagors. A hand note was subsequently executed by one of the family
members in the amount of $61,859.67. The maker of the hand note defaulted
and the lender obtained a $74,453.14 judgment against the six makers of the
collateral mortgage note. In affirming the liability of the six family members for
the debt represented by the hand note, the court made the following
observation:
While it is established that the hand note is the debt instrnunent in a
collateral mortgage arrangement, it is equally clear that the maker of the
collateral mortgage note is personally liable thereon. A collateral
mortgage note, such as the one signed by appellants in the instant case,
is a negotiable instrument.... Accordingly the collateral mortgage
note creates a personal obligation for which the maker is liable....
However, such personal liability is limited to the lesser of the face
amount of the collateral mortgage note and the amount owed in
connection with the hand note.9
What was implicated in Bailey was clearly expressed in Lowry: the maker
of a collateral mortgage note is personally liable; his liability is not limited to the
value of the property which secures the note." While the court made this
seemingly broad statement, it never indicated whether the mortgaged property
was sufficient to satisfy the $74,453.14 judgment. Without knowing what the
mortgaged property would bring in a sheriff's sale, it would seem the court was
premature in speculating on the personal liability of the maker of the collateral
mortgage note beyond the value of the mortgaged property." Nevertheless, the
7. 533 So. 2d 170 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988), revd in part, 539 So. 2d 46 (1989).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 172-73.
10. Id.
11. Interestingly, Judge Foret, who authored the majority opinion in Lowry, also filed a concurring
opinion in Lowy in which he questioned the correctness of the Bailey opinion and its implication
that the maker of a collateral mortgage note be held personally liable on the note. Judge Foret noted
in his concurrence that "[t]o hold the maker personally liable over and above the value of the
property amounts to personal suretyship, which must be express in no uncertain terms.... I doubt
that suretyship would be found in this case." 533 So. 2d at 176. On an application for writs to the
supreme court, Justice Calogero filed a concurring opinion on a partial granting of writs and
recognized that the issue of personal liability of the maker of a collateral mortgage note had not been
decided by the Court. While the issue was not before the court on appeal, Justice Calogero stated
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court firmly stated its position in relation to the personal liability of the maker
of a collateral mortgage note.
C. Merchants & Farmers Bank & Trust v. Smith
To complete the trilogy, the third circuit in Merchants & Farmers Bank &
Trust v. Smith 2 once again affirmed its position that the maker of a collateral
mortgage note is personally liable on the note beyond the value of the mortgaged
property. In Smith, Rivers and Smith executed a collateral mortgage and
collateral mortgage note to secure a hand note executed by Smith and endorsed
by Rivers.' 3 Smith defaulted on the hand note and the lender sued Rivers on
the collateral mortgage note. Rivers denied liability beyond the value of the
mortgaged property. Affirming its earlier decisions, the court found that the
maker of a collateral mortgage note is personally liable on the pledged note for
the obligation created by the hand note. 4
Unlike Bailey and Lowry, the court's finding Rivers personally liable was
probably correct. Rivers, as the co-maker of the collateral mortgage note, had
also endorsed the hand note. Because Smith was unable to pay the hand note
when it became due, the note was dishonored. 5 Under Louisiana Revised
Statutes 10:3-415, when an instrument is dishonored, an endorser is obligated to
pay the amount due on the instrument. 6 Thus, Rivers would have incurred
separatepersonal liability on the hand note as opposed to personal liability on the
collateral mortgage note. The court likely avoided this distinction because of
contested testimony concerning whether or not the lender and Rivers intended
that "he was signing the reverse side of the hand note only to acknowledge the
collateral mortgage and collateral mortgage note as security for the hand
note."' 7
that he "would be inclined to favor granting such a writ so that this Court could consider and decide
the issue." 539 So. 2d 46, 47 (La. 1989).
12. 559 So. 2d 845 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See La. R.S. 10:3-502, which provides in part:
(a) Dishonor of a note is governed by the following rules:
(1) If the note is payable on demand, the note is dishonored if presentment is duly made
to the maker and the note is not paid on the day of presentment.
(2) If the note is not payable on demand and is payable at or through a bank or the terms
of the note require presentment, the note is dishonored if presentment is duly made and
the note is not paid on the day it becomes payable or the day of presentment, whichever
is later.
(3) If the note is not payable on demand and Paragraph (2) does not apply, the note is
dishonored if it is not paid on the day it becomes payable.
16. See La. RPS. 10:3-415 (1993).
17. 559 So. 2d. at 848.
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III. THE CONTRARY POSITION: No PERSONAL LIABILITY
A. Commercial National Bank in Shreveport v. Succession of Rogers
Faced with the "Third Circuit Trilogy," the second circuit in Commercial
National Bank v. Rogers' declined to hold the maker of a collateral mortgage
note personally liable beyond the value of the mortgaged property. In Rogers,
Hartsfield, Bennett, and Rogers, along with each of their wives, executed a
collateralmortgage and $500,000 collateralmortgage note to secure the $350,000
hand note executed by Hartsfied, Bennet, and Rogers without their wives.'
9
The husbands defaulted, the mortgaged property was sold, and the lender sought
to recover a deficiency judgment against the husbands and their respective wives.
In affirming the trial court's decision that the wives incurred no personal
liability, the second circuit held that "under the facts of this case, the makers of
the collateral mortgage note who did not execute the hand note have no liability
beyond the value of the mortgaged property."20 The court reasoned that the
hand note and not the collateral mortgage note represented the actual debt.
2
Since the wives did not execute the hand note nor express any intention to
become personally liable by signing the collateral mortgage and the collateral
mortgage note, they incurred no personal liability beyond the value of the
mortgaged property.
The court went further to state that if the lender wanted to hold the wives
personally liable on the hand note, it could have required the wives to sign the
hand note or "execute some other document guaranteeing payment of the
underlying debt.... ." Such a personal guarantee would have amounted to a
contract of suretyship which "must be express and in writing."23 Because no
such agreement existed, the lender's recovery against the wives was limited to
the value of the mortgaged property.
In contrast to its decision in Rogers, the second circuit did find that "some
other document guaranteeing payment of the underlying debt" existed in Ruston"
State Bank v. Colvin.2' In Colvin, the collateral mortgagors did not sign the
hand note, although they did execute a document in addition to the collateral
mortgage and collateral mortgage note. The additional document expressed an
intention that the collateral mortgagors be bound in solido with the makers of the
hand note for the obligation evidencedby the hand note. Because this document
created solidary liability on the principal obligation, the makers of the collateral
mortgage note were personally liable beyond the value of the mortgaged
18. 628 So. 2d 33 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 36.
21. Id. at 33.
22. Id. at 37.
23. La. Civ. Code art. 3038.
24. 679 So. 2d 162 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1996).
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property. This additional document, along with the intent of the parties, created
personal liability on behalf of the collateralmortgagors. While the court did not
express an opinion as to whether this additional document was a suretyship
contract such a finding would have been supported by the facts of the
case.2
B. Pontchartrain State Bank v. Lybrand
In a lengthy criticism of the "Third Circuit Trilogy", the court in Pontchar-
train State Bank v. Lybrand adopted the position that the liability of the maker
of a collateral mortgage note is "limited to the value of the property that stands
behind the collateral mortgage.""' In Lybrand, four individuals executed a
collateral mortgage and collateral mortgage note to secure the hand note of one
of the individuals." Faced with the question of whether or not the maker of
a collateral mortgage note is personally liable on the debt represented by the
hand note, the court answered in the negative. It reasoned that "the maker of the
collateral mortgage and collateral mortgage note who pledges that mortgage and
note to secure the hand note of a third party is typically not asked to co-sign the
hand note because there is a common understanding that liability is limited to the
value of the property that stands behind the collateral mortgage."2 9
The court also echoed the second circuit's view in Succession of Rogers that
to impose personal liability on the collateral mortgagor would require a finding
of a suretyship agreement. The court stated that to "impose personal liability [on
a collateral mortgagor who secures the debt of a third person] is, at a minimum,
to sanction the circumvention of Louisiana's strict requirement that personal
suretyship be express."30 Because a standard collateral mortgage does not
express the unequivocal intent that the collateral mortgagor personally bind
himself to the creditor, no suretyship contract exists and thus the collateral
mortgagor is not personally liable for the debt of a third person.
C. Bank of New Orleans and Trust Co. v. H.P.B., Jr. Development Co.
Although the United States District Court in Lybrand distinguished the
"Third Circuit Trilogy" because of a supposed lack of jurisprudence supporting
its position, it neglected to analyze the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal's
25. The additional document the collateral mortgagors executed stated in part that"we the signers,
endorsers, guarantors, and sureties and each of us in solido, promise to pay ... ." 679 So. 2d at 164.
This language would have been sufficient to create a contract of suretyship under Louisiana Civil
Code article 3038 which states that "[s]uretyship must be express and in writing."
26. 799 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. La. 1992).
27. Id. at 640.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 641.
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decision, Bank of New Orleans and Trust Co. v. H.P.B., Jr. Development Co.3
Like the other decisions discussed above, H.P.B., Jr. Development Co. also
involved the issue of the personal liability of a collateral mortgagor who secures
the debt of a third person. Like the collateral mortgagor in Merchants &
Farmers Bank & Trust v. Smith, the collateral mortgagor in H.P.B., Jr.
Development Co. also signed the back of the hand note. However, the court
noted that the collateral mortgagor "executed the back of the hand note only to
effectuate the pledge of the collateral mortgage,... as recited, and [the collateral
mortgagor] did not execute or endorse as a co-maker or solidary surety. In other
words, [the collateral mortgage] was in rem and [the collateral mortgagor] had
no in personam liability... 32 Although the quoted language was not
essential to the court's disposition of the case, the court's position in terms of the
personal liability of the maker of the collateral mortgage note was made clear:
the maker of a collateral mortgage note is not personally liable on such note
when it is used to secure the debt of a third person.
IV. THE BiRTH OF THE CONTROVERSY
While Bailey is "the linchpin case for the argument that collateral mortgages
do create personal liability for the maker,"33 Professor Rubin's law review
article3" was the catalyst that sparked the conflict between the circuits. As
stated by Judge Foret in his concurrence in Lowry, "I based the result in my
opinion on the Bailey case and on Rubin's law review article."3 Even Justice
Calogero, in his concurrence in the partial granting of writs in Lowry, acknowl-
edged Professor Rubin's influence on the position that the maker of the collateral
mortgage note is subject to personal liability beyond the value of the mortgaged
property.36
Professor Rubin's article sets forth two principle arguments to support the
view that the maker of a collateral mortgage note is personally liable for the
deficiency due after seizure and sale of the mortgaged property. The first
argument focuses on the accessory nature of a mortgage while the second is
primarily based on the position that the collateral mortgage is not an in rem
mortgage.
In relation to the first argument, Professor Rubin states that "[t]he personal
liability of the maker of the collateral mortgage note is a necessity because a
mortgage is an accessory obligation.... If the collateral mortgage note
imparted no personal liability to its maker, the mortgage would secure nothing
31. 427 So. 2d 486 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
32. Id. at 490.
33. 799 F. Supp. 633, 634 (E.D. La. 1992).
34. Michael H. Rubin, Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-79 Term: Security
Devices, 40 La. L Rev. 572 (1979-80).
35. 533 So. 2d 170, 175 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988), rev'd in part, 539 So. 2d 46 (1989).
36. 539 So. 2d 46, 47 (La. 1989).
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and would fall of its own weight."'37 While there can be no argument that the
"[m]ortgage is accessory to the obligation which it secures,"3 the quoted
statement fails to recognize that the hand note, and not the collateral mortgage
note, is the obligation which the collateral mortgage "indirectly" secures. 9 The
"collateral mortgage note does not represent the indebtedness; it is the security
that is pledged to secure another note, usually the hand note, which represents
the indebtedness.""' As stated by Louisiana Civil Code article 3297, "ft]he
mortgagee's recourse for the satisfaction of an obligation secured by a mortgage
may be limited in whole or in part to the property over which the mortgage is
established." Under the express language of Louisiana Civil Code article 3297,
"obligations secured by a mortgage" is broad enough to encompass obligations
"directly" or "indirectly" secured by a mortgage. The code article itself posses
no restrictions on the nature of the obligation secured so that a collateral
mortgage could indirectly secure the obligation evidenced by the hand, as
opposed to the collateral mortgage, note.
Vital to understanding the accessory nature of the mortgage contract,
especially in relation to securing the debt of a third person, is the distinction
between the obligation which the mortgage itself creates and the obligation
created by the hand note which the mortgage indirectly secures. The mortgage
contract creates an accessory obligation which is a real, not a personal,
obligation: the mortgage burdens the property of the mortgagor, not the person
of the mortgagor." As a result, "[a]n agreement that enforcement of the
obligation will be restricted to proceeds realized from execution upon the
mortgaged property is not contrary to the accessory nature of the security."' 2
Whether the mortgagor also incurs personal liability in relation to the obligation
which the mortgage secures depends on the "[c]ontracts or agreements limiting
the right of recourse of the creditor to the mortgaged property.. . for satisfac-
tion of the principal obligation, ... not the accessory rights securing it.' 43
Even if the mortgagee's recourse is limited, the mortgage continues to be a real
right that burdens the property of the mortgagor and secures the obligation of the
third person up to the value of the property.
The conclusion that the mortgage would not lose its fundamental characteris-
tic as an accessory obligation if the mortgagor incurred no personal liability is
supported by the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Schexnailder v.
37. Rubin, supra note 34, at 582-83.
38. La. Civ. Code art. 3282.
39. See First Guar. Bank v. Alford, 366 So. 2d 1299, 1302 (La. 1978) ("A collateral mortgage
indirectly secures a debt via a pledge.").
40. Cameron Brown S., Inc. v. East Glen Oaks, Inc., 341 So. 2d 450, 456 (La. App. Ist Cir.
1976).
41. See La. Civ. Code art. 1763 which states, "A real obligation is a duty correlative and
incidental to a real right."
42. La. Civ. Code art. 3282, rev. cMt. (a). Such a mortgage which imparts no personal liability
is what is referred to as the "in rem mortgage."
43. La. Civ. Code art. 3297, rev. cmt. (b).
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Fontenot." In analyzing Louisiana Civil Code article 3285 (1870), which was
the predecessor to current Louisiana Civil Code article 3282, the court made the
following observation concerning the validity of a mortgage that imported no
personal liability on the mortgagor:
[t]here must be a principal indebtedness or obligation to support the
accessory stipulation or lien of the mortgage, but this does not mean
that there shall be a personal liability. A mortgage, whether conven-
tional or judicial, imposes a real right or obligation upon the property
bound for its discharge .... There is nothing to prevent, and, in fact,
it is not uncommon for a mortgage to be given with the stipulation that
the mortgagor shall not be personally bound beyond the value of the
property so mortgaged.4"
Limiting a creditor's recourse to the value of the mortgaged property would not
violate the fundamental requirement that a principal obligation exist. An
obligation exists, but such obligation is real and not personal. However, this
leads to the conclusion that the collateral mortgage is an in rem mortgage and as
such, runs counter to Professor Rubin's argument that the collateral mortgage is
not, and cannot be, an "in rem" mortgage.
Professor Rubin begins his argument by stating that "[t]he collateral
mortgage package is not an in rem obligation, and the creditor's rights should not
be restricted to the amount the mortgage property brings at a sheriff's sale.""'
Professor Rubin then sets forth three reasons why classifying collateral mortgages
as "in rem"' mortgages would seriously effect commercial transactions in
Louisiana:
First, it would require overruling a series of cases that have enforced
mortgages and collateral mortgages pledged by one person to secure the
debt of another. Second, it would alter the usual and customary concept
of "in rem" mortgages. Third, it would mean that a collateral mortgage
note is non-negotiable.47
In regard to classifying a collateral mortgage note as non-negotiable if the
note is part of an "in ren" mortgage, Professor Rubin's position may no longer
be correct under current Louisiana commercial law. Although a negotiable
instrument must still contain an "unconditional promise ... to pay a fixed
amount of money,"" a "promise ... is not made conditional ... because
payment is limited to resort to a particular fund or source."49 This is a change
44. 85 So. 207 (La. 1920).
45. Id. at 210.
46. Rubin, supra note 34, at 583.
47. Id.
48. La. R.S. 10:3-104(a).
49. La. R.S. 10:3-106(b).
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from the former law which made a note conditional, and thus non-negotiable,
when recovery was limited to a particular fund or to the value of a particular
piece of collateral."0 Thus, under former Louisiana law, if recovery of a
collateral mortgage note was limited to the value of the mortgaged property, the
note was not an unconditional promise and non-negotiable.
Because Louisiana courts have not yet defined what is included in "a
particular fund or source" under Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:3-106(b), it is
arguable that a collateral mortgage note which limits recovery to the value of the
mortgaged property may still be classified as a non-negotiable instrument. If an
"in rem" collaterlmortgage note is non-negotiable, the ramifications of labeling
the note as such is two fold according to Professor Rubin. Labeling collateral
mortgage notes as non-negotiable would require the overruling of a series of
cases that have enforced collateral mortgages pledged by one person to secure the
debt of another and would "destroy the utility of collateral mortgages" when used
in executory proceedings."'
In support of his position that certain cases would require overruling,
Professor Rubin cites Rex Finance Co. v. Cary2 and Baker Bank and Trust Co.
v. Behrnes.53 Although Professor Rubin did not express why these cases would
have to be overruled, one can assume such an overruling would occur as a result
of classifying a collateral mortgage note as non-negotiable. Arguably, the two
cited cases stand for the proposition that the holder of a collateral mortgage note
should be able to enforce such a note as a negotiable instrument in order to
facilitate the practice of pledging a collateral mortgage note to secure the hand
note of a third person. The creditor who is a holder in due course could enforce
the collateral mortgage note as a negotiable instrument, free of the claims and
defenses the collateral mortgagor may have against the third person whose debt
the mortgagor secured with the collateral mortgage note.' If the collateral
mortgage note were non-negotiable, the creditor's enforcement of the note
against the collateral mortgagor would be subject to the collateral mortgagor's
defenses against the third person whose debt was secured. This arguably would
defeat the commercial attractiveness of using the collateral mortgage as a device
to secure the debts of a third person.
However, just because the classification of a collateral mortgage note as non-
negotiable is commercially unappealing does not lead to the conclusion that such
classification is not legally sound. In fact, the Louisiana Supreme Court in First
50. See La. R.S. 10:3-105(2)(b) (1974); Rubin, supra note 34, at 583; La. R.S. 10:3-106(b), cmt.
I which provides in part: "Under Section 3-106(b) a promise or order is not made conditional
because payment is limited to payment from a particular source or fund. This reverses the result of
former Section 3-105(2)(b). There is no cogent reason why the general credit of a legal entity must
be pledged to have a negotiable instrument."
51. Rubin, supra note 34, at 583.
52. 154 So. 2d 360 (La. 1963).
53. 217 So. 2d 461 (La. App. it Cir. 1968).
54. See La. R.S. 10:3-305 (1993).
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Guaranty Bank v. Alford s expressed its concern in labeling a collateral
mortgage note a negotiable instrument. In Alford, a husband and wife executed
a collateral mortgage and collateral mortgage note to secure a specified $155,000
hand note signed by the husband. 6 The husband subsequently obtained
additional advances on separate promissory notes which were purportedly secured
by the original pledge of the collateral mortgage note. In finding that the wife,
as pledgor, did not agree to secure the subsequent loans, the court held that the
subsequent advances were not secured by the prior pledge of the collateral
mortgage note. The court found that although "the collateral mortgage note was
in effect a negotiable bearer instrument, a matter which we initially found
troubling, is of no moment. It was not a debt instrument but a security device,
a pledge instrument.""7
Important in the court's analysis was the distinction it recognized between
a debt instrument and a pledge instrument, a distinction that was overlooked or
ignored in Rex Finance Co. v. Cary8 and Baker Bank and Trust Co. v.
Behrnes.59 As a true debt instrument, a collateral mortgage bearer note could
be transferred to a total stranger who, as a holder in due course, could then
enforce the note against the collateral mortgagor.6" Such enforcement would
require no showing of a relationship between the stranger and the collateral
mortgagor. The collateralmortgagor's liability would not be limited to the value
of the mortgaged property. As stated by the court in Behrnes, "we [cannot]
accept the argument that the intention of the parties control whether there is a
pledge or a negotiation of the note. We have already found that a pledgee of a
negotiable instrument is a holder thereof by operation of law."'" The logical
extension of this statement would result in a total disregard of the purpose of the
collateralmortgage: an indirect security device for the payment of the hand note
which represents the true indebtedness.62 The view that the collateral mortgage
note is a debt instrument, as opposed to a pledge instrument, enforceable
independent of the hand note disregards the basic premise that a collateral
mortgage is an accessory and not a principal contract. The collateral mortgage
note would be enforceable regardless of the status of the principal debt
represented by the hand note. However, because the court in Alford appeared to
reject the position that a collateral mortgage note is a debt instrument, one can
argue that the cort's language overruled the implication that a collateral
mortgage note is a negotiable instrument.
55. 366 So. 2d 1299 (La. 1978).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1303.
58. 154 So. 2d 360 (La. 1963).
59. 217 So. 2d 461 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1968).
60. See La. R.S. 10:3-305 (1993).
61. 217 So. 2d at 463.
62. See Cameron Brown S., Inc. v. East Glen Oaks, Inc., 341 So. 2d 450 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1976).
1999]
LOUISIANA LA W RE VIEW
While classifying a collateral mortgage note as a non-negotiable instrument
would support the position that the note is "in rem," Professor Rubin would
undoubtedly argue that such a finding would destroy the utility of the collateral
mortgage in terms of enforcement through executory process. As stated by
Professor Rubin, "[s]uch a note, being non-negotiable, could not be transferred
by mere delivery; authentic evidence of the transfer would be necessary in order
to bring about executory proceedings." '
Although Professor Rubin's statement was probably correct when he
made it, the adoption of Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial Law by
the legislature in 1990 leads to a contrary conclusion today." Under
current law, there is no longer a "true pledge" of the collateral mortgage
note. The Civil Code articles on pledge were displaced by the provisions
of Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:9-101 et. seq. and the provisions of the
"Collateral Mortgage Act."
s
Today, a creditor obtains rights to a collateral mortgage note by perfecting
a security interest in the collateral mortgage note under the provision of Chapter
9 of the Louisiana Commercial Laws." Once perfected, the assignment or
other transfer of the collateral mortgage note can be proven by a private writing
without the need of authentic evidence."7 Under Louisiana Revised Statutes
10:9-508(l)(b), such a private writing is deemed authentic for purposes of
executory process."8 The collateral mortgagor or subsequent transferees can
transfer the collateral mortgage note without the need of authentic evidence of
such transfer, even where such note is non-negotiable. All that is required
for foreclosure on the collateral mortgage and collateral mortgage note is
that the collateral mortgage note be subject to a Chapter 9 security
interest.
63. Rubin, supra note 34, at 583.
64. See Louisiana Nat'l Bank of Baton Rouge v. Heroman, 280 So. 2d 362 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1973). Prior to 1990, the Civil Code articles on pledge controlled the rights of the pledgee and
pledgor with respect to the collateral mortgage note.
65. La. R.S. 9:5550-5557 (1991 and Supp. 1999).
66. La. R.S. 9:5551 (Supp. 1999).
67. See La. R.S. 10:9-508(l)(b) which provides in part: "the assignment, pledge, orother transfer
in whole or in part, of an obligation or of any right therein or thereto secured by a security interest
subject to the provisions of [Chapter 9]... may be proven by any form of private writing signed
by the secured party, or any person entitled to effect such a transfer, and such writing shall be
deemed authentic for purposes of executory process."
68. See also La. Code Civ. P. art. 2636 which provides in part: "The following documentary
evidence shall be deemed to be authentic for purposes of executory process: (1) The note, bond,
or other instrument evidencing the obligation secured by the mortgage, security agreement, or
privilege, paraphed for identification with the act of mortgage or privilege by the notary or other
officer before whom it is executed, with the exception that a paraph is not necessary in connection
with a note secured by a security agreement subject to Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial
Laws." A collateral mortgage note is an "instrument evidencing the obligation secured by the
mortgage", which note is secured by a Chapter 9 security agreement Thus, a collateral mortgage
note is "deemed to be authentic for purposes of executory process."
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V. CONCLUSION
The maker of a collateral mortgage note does not incur personal liability
when he executes a collateral mortgage and collateral mortgage note to secure
the debt of a third person. When the maker of a collateral mortgage note is not
a party to the hand note, the maker's liability should be limited to the value of
the property subject to the collateral mortgage. Although the third circuit has
rendered three opinions imposing personal liability on the maker of a collateral
mortgage in such a situation, the second circuit has taken an opposite and more
defensible position. The second circuit's approach would not impose personal
liability on the maker of a collateral mortgage note when the note is used to
secure the debt of a third person.
When a collateral mortgage note secures the debt of a third person, the
collateral mortgage note is used as a pledge instrument as opposed to a debt
instrument. The debt instrument is the hand note which represents the principal
obligation incurred by the third person. Recognition that the hand note is
evidence of the principal obligation also reinforces the fundamental principle that
a mortgage is an accessory obligation. While the collateral mortgage note is not
a mortgage contract in itself, it is a security device that indirectly secures the
principal obligation represented by the hand note. The collateral mortgage note
simply facilitates the accessory obligation represented by the collateral mortgage
contract.
Unless the collateral mortgagor signs a separate instrument evidencing an
intent to become a surety or co-signs the hand note,69 the collateral mortgagor's
liability should be limited to the value of the property mortgaged. Because the
collateral mortgage note is not evidence of the indebtedness, it should not be
independently enforced as a negotiable instrument. These observations result
from the conclusion that the collateral mortgage note represents an "in rem"
obligation. As an "in rem"f obligation, the collateral mortgage note maintains its
position as a pledge instrument, avoiding the result of subjecting the entire
patrimony of the collateral mortgagor to the claims of a creditor. Although the
collateral mortgage note would be non-negotiable as a result of being an in-rem
obligation, the collateral mortgage note would still be enforceable under
Louisiana's executory process because of the provisions of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 10:9-508(I)(b).
Jason P. Bergeron
69. See Pontchartrain State Bank v. Lybrand, 799 F. Supp. 633,640 (E.D. La. 1992) ("the maker
of the collateral mortgage and collateral mortgage note who pledges that mortgage and note to secure
the hand note of a third party is typically not asked to co-sign the hand note because there is a
common understanding that liability is limited to the value of the property that stands behind the
collateral mortgage.").
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